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BUTTERFLIES, CAVE SPIDERS, MILK-VETCH, BUNCHGRASS,
SEDGES, LILIES, CHECKER-MALLOWS AND WHY THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST JUDICIAL BALANCING OF HARM
UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IS A GOOD IDEA
FEDERICO CHEEVER"
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1978, at least, it has been the received wisdom that the
Endangered Species Act of 1973' prohibits courts from balancing the
value of protected species against the value of the economic activities their
protection might displace.2  Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill defending the "power of the Chancellor to do
equity" 3-the discretion of the district court to allow the destruction of a
species for the benefit of the Tellico dam-has never developed any
significant following among the lower federal courts.4
"Associate Professor of Law at the University of Denver College of Law. B.A./M.A.
1981, Stanford University; J.D. 1986, UCLA School of Law. I would like to thank
Jeffery Koy for his invaluable research assistance, the members of the William and Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review, David Barnes, and Mary McNeil Cheever.
'16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1994).
2 See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978) ("[T]he plain
language of the [Endangered Species] Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows
clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as 'incalculable.' Quite
obviously, it would be difficult for a court to balance the loss of a sum certain-even
$100 million- against a congressionally declared 'incalculable' value .... ).
Id. at 212. (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-
30 (1944)).
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor
to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The
qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for
nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private claims. We do not
believe that such a major departure from that long tradition as is here
proposed should be lightly implied .... [I]f Congress desired to make
such an abrupt departure from traditional equity practice as is
suggested, it would have made its desire plain.
Id.
' See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 160 (1st. Cir. 1997) ("Under the ESA, however, the
balancing and public interest prongs have been answered by Congress' determination
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Some courts, however, are challenging this orthodoxy. In
particular, the United States Supreme Court, after ignoring the substantive
provisions of the Endangered Species Act for a decade and a half, is toying
with the statute again. In musings characteristic of opinions from that
Court, Justices have dropped a few hints that the lower courts should take
a more "reasonable" approach to applying the Endangered Species Act.5
Neither of the Court's recent cases, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Greater Oregon6 nor Bennett v. Spear,7 contain any
holdings likely to shake the lower courts, but they add new fire to a
twenty-year old debate.
In this article, I argue that the orthodoxy makes sense. The
Endangered Species Act, as currently administered, cannot tolerate judicial
balancing of species harm and economic dislocation while still honoring
the purpose of the statute-the preservation and recovery of protected
species and the ecosystems on which they depend.8 The inadvisability of a
balancing approach to species preservation under the Act is not the
function of a value judgment exalting animals over humans.9 Rather, it is
the direct result of the administrative and judicial application of the Act's
listing process.
that the balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor of protected
species."); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1996); Forest
Conservation Council v. Roseboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The
district court's conclusion that the ESA forecloses citizen-suit claims of an imminent
threat of harm to protected wildlife is contrary to the letter and spirit of the statute's
purpose-to conserve endangered species."); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R.,
23 F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994); Bensman v. United States Forest Serv., 984 F. Supp.
1242 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (refusing to weigh "the harm the agency action would impose on
the Indiana bats against the other competing interests of the Forest Service.");
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1179 (M.D.
Fla. 1995) (refusing to balance species protection against value of affected "economic
and social enterprises"). But see Sierra Club v. Lujan, 36 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533,
1554 (W.D. Tex. 1993); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1277 (E.D. Tex. 1988),
aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d
429 (5th Cir. 1991).
' See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Com-
munities for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
6 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
S117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
8 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b), (c)(1) (1994).
9 See Ike C. Sugg, Flies Before People, WALL ST. J., February 11, 1997, at A20 ("Offi-
cials of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service wouldn't hurt a fly-but they seem quite
willing to endanger people who need medical care.").
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The Endangered Species Act tells us that an endangered species is
a species "which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range .... ."'I The agencies charged with making the admini-
strative determinations as to what constitutes an endangered species have
interpreted the statutory definition to cover only species dramatically
reduced in distribution and numbers and, generally, subject to multiple
threats." Listed endangered species are the true hard luck cases in the
process of human transformation of the Earth's environment. 2
It is a bad idea to balance the value of most endangered species
against the economic cost of their protection because their circumstances
are so precarious. Once a species is perched on the brink of extinction,
compromise becomes unacceptably dangerous; what may look like
"reasonable" accommodation may lead to annihilation.'3 If we really
intend to protect species from extinction, the allowable minimum level of
regulatory prohibition and active management is that level necessary to
insure a good chance of species survival in the long term (however
defined). Because we only list species in dire need of protection and
assistance, this "minimum level of protection" generally requires, at least,
the level of regulatory prohibition the Endangered Species Act provides.
In this article, I first endeavor to establish the proposition that
federal courts, urged by litigants and unsettled by the Supreme Court's
delphic pronouncements, are beginning to reassess the twenty year-old
prohibition against balancing imposed by Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill. I then provide brief sketches of thirteen recently listed endangered
species to illustrate why a balancing approach would be such a bad idea.
II. QUESTIONING THE ORTHODOXY
A. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill: The Orthodoxy
In 1966, Congress authorized the Tellico Dam Project in the Little
0 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994).
Factors for Listing, Delisting or Reclassifying Species, 50 C.F.R. § 424.11 (1997).
2 The Endangered Species Act tells us that "threatened species" are species "likely to
become endangered in the foreseeable future." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1994). The
prognosis for most listed threatened species at the time of listing is not much better that it
is for endangered species. This article does not discuss threatened species.
" See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505, 47,506(1975) (discussing the failure of a TVA program to transplant the Snail Darter into
another river and why that program fails under the Act.)
1998] 315
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Tennessee River Valley. By March 1976, the main dam, spillway and
auxiliary dams were 85 percent complete. 4 On October 9, 1975, the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the "USFWS") listed the snail
darter, a "small tannish-colored fish,"" as an endangered species.' 6
Closing the Tellico dam and filling the reservoir "would [have] result[ed]
in the total destruction of the snail darter's habitat."'7  Environmental
plaintiffs and local residents sued in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee. The District Court forthrightly admitted
that closing the dam would destroy the known habitat of the species and
would thereby violate the Endangered Species Act's prohibition against
actions likely to jeopardize the continued existence of species,'" but it
exercised its equitable discretion and refused to issue an injunction
preventing completion and closure of the dam.'9 The Sixth Circuit
reversed," and in June 1978, the Supreme Court affirmed and amplified
the Sixth Circuit opinion."
It is hard to overemphasize the significance of the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. Not only
did it remain the only Supreme Court consideration of the substantive
provisions of the Endangered Species Act for seventeen years, it also
characterized the Act as placing the goal of "revers[ing] the trend toward
species extinction" above considerations of cost,22 and explicitly precluded
courts from engaging in traditional equitable balancing in determining
whether to issue an injunction in the face of a violation of the Act. 3
In the summer of 1978, Congress took another look at the
Endangered Species Act in light of the Supreme Court's opinion."' While
'" See Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd,
549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
'5 See id. at 755.
6 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505 (1975).
7 Id. at 47,506.
"8 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). Note that prior to 1978, section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act contained a single paragraph. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
'9 419 F. Supp. at 763 ("If plaintiffs' argument were taken to its logical extreme, the Act
would require a court to halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam if an
endangered species were discovered in the river on the day before such impoundment
was scheduled to take place. We cannot conceive that Congress intended such a result.").
20 See Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
2' See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
22 Id. at 184-85.
23 See id. at 187-88.
24 See Eric Erdheim, The Wake of the Snail Darter: Insuring the Effectiveness of Section
316 [Vol. 22:313
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the 1978 amendments to the Act did create a narrow, cumbersome,
statutory exemption process,"5 the fundamental Supreme Court holding
7 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 ECOLOGY L. Q. 629, 636-44 (1981).
5 If a biological opinion issued under the post-1978 section 7 indicates that the action
will violate the jeopardy prohibition of section 7 and there are no "reasonable prudent
alternatives" which would allow the action to go forward without violating the
prohibition, the action agency, any applicant, or the Governor of the State may apply for
an exemption. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(1) (1994). This process was created "to
determine whether the economic benefits of a proposed federal action outweigh the
benefits of protecting a species." GAO/RCED 92-131, Endangered Species Act: Types
and Numbers of Implementing Actions (1992). An application must be filed no later
than 90 days after the completion of the consultation process. See id. § 1536(g)(2)(A).
The exemption application's final determination is made by the Endangered Species
Committee (the "Committee"), id., sometimes called the "God Committee" or "God
Squad" because of its godlike power to relegate an entire species to oblivion. The
Committee's only job is to consider exemption applications. See id. § 1536(e). The
Committee is made up of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and one individual from each affected state
chosen by the Secretary of the Interior and appointed by the President. See id. §
1536(e)(3).
If the Secretary of the Interior determines that an exemption application meets
procedural requirements, the Secretary must submit a report to the Committee. See id. §
1536(g)(5). The report must discuss the following:
(A) the availability of reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action, and the nature and extent of the benefits of the agency
action and of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving
the species or the critical habitat;
(B) a summary of the evidence concerning whether or not the
agency action is in the public interest and is of national or regional
significance;
(C) appropriate reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures
which should be considered by the Committee; and
(D) whether the Federal [action] agency concerned and the
exemption applicant refrained from making any [prohibited] irrever-
sible or irretrievable commitment of resources ....
Id.
After receiving the report, the Committee has 30 days to determine whether or
not to grant an exemption. See id. § 1536(h)(1). In order for the Committee to grant an
exemption, five or more of the Committee members voting in person must determine,
based on the Secretary's report and record of the hearing, that:
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of
alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or
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remained unchanged. Outside a few specific statutorily sanctioned
processes, balancing remained forbidden.26
The Supreme Court decided Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, which requires federal
agencies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize the continued
existence of protected species or their designated critical habitat." Lower
courts extended the Court's prohibition against balancing to the Act's
other primary prohibitive provision-Section 9.28 Section 9 prohibits any
"person" from "taking" any member of an endangered species of wild-
life.29 The definition of "take" includes the actions: "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in
any such conduct."" In 1986, Judge Samuel King, ordered the Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources to remove a herd of Mouflon
sheep from the habitat of the endangered Palila, a native Hawaiian bird, on
the slopes of Mauna Kea on the Island of Hawaii." The Department
argued that the court's ruling ran counter to its "multiple use" mandate, to
its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal [action] agency concerned nor the
exemption applicant made any [prohibited] irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources ....
16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(l)(A).
26 The Endangered Species Act requires the designation of critical habitat for listed
species. Id. § 1533(b)(2). In contrast to the listing process, the Act expressly requires
consideration of economic impact in designation of critical habitat. Id. The Secretary of
the Interior "may exclude any area from critical habitat if ... the benefits of such
exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat,
unless ... the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction
of the species concerned." Id.
27 Id. § 1536(a)(2).
28 See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1132 (E.D. Cal.
1992); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 688 F. Supp. 1334, 1355 (D. Minn. 1988), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989). For an excellent discussion of the
issuance of injunctions under section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, see Steven G.
Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under the Endangered
Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE& ENVTL. L. 155, 173-75 (1995).
29 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B).
30 Id. § 1532(19). By its terms, the section 9 prohibition against takings applies only to
endangered species of fish and wildlife. However, USFWS regulations extend the
prohibition to threatened species of wildlife. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c), 17.31(a) (1997).




protect endangered species and encourage sport hunting. 2 The court
disagreed and extended the prohibition against balancing: "[T]he
Endangered Species Act does not allow a 'balancing' approach for
multiple use considerations. I have found that mouflon sheep are
'harming' the Palila population .... Once this significant negative impact
has been shown, the Act leaves no room for mixed use or other
management strategies or policies.""
The significance of the prohibition against balancing took ten years
to surface. In 1988, we entered the age of sweeping Endangered Species
Act injunctions: closing down the national forests in Texas to protect the
Red-Cockaded Woodpecker, ' closing down the national forests in
Washington, Oregon, and Northern California to protect the Northern
Spotted Owl,35 closing down national forests in Idaho to protect
endangered salmon runs,36 and closing down the national forests in
Arizona and New Mexico to protect the Mexican Spotted Owl.3
B. Babbitt v. Sweet Home: Hints
In the mid-1990's, fully aware of this dramatic history of broad
injunctions, the Supreme Court chose two Endangered Species Act cases
for review. 8 The cases it chose had almost nothing to do with balancing
the value of species protection against its economic cost.
First came Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon.39 As noted above, Section 9 of the Endangered Species
32 See id. at 1080.
I d. at 1081 (citations omitted).
'4 See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated in
part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yuetter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991)
(upholding district court injunction until USFWS could develop a permissible forest
management program for Texas).
" See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming
standing, possibility of injunction, and order of supplementary environmental impact
statements for environmental groups suing to protect northern spotted owl habitat).
36 See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 854 F. Supp. 713 (D. Or. 1993), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding and extending the injunction of
ongoing activities of USFWS).
31 See Silver v. Thomas, 924 F. Supp. 976 (D. Ariz. 1995).
3 See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
3' 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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Act prohibits any person"0 from "taking" any member of a protected
species of wildlife. To "take" a species is to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.""' The USFWS, through regulations, defines "harass" as an
"act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral
patterns," 2 and it defines "harm" as an "act which actually kills or injures
wildlife [and which] may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering.""3 The definitions of the terms "harm" and "harass" extend the
taking prohibition to both protected species members and their essential
habitat.
In 1994, the District of Columbia Circuit Court invalidated
USFWS regulations including habitat modification within the definition of
take." In 1995, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Greater Oregon, the United States Supreme Court reversed the District of
Columbia Circuit and upheld the authority of USFWS to promulgate
regulations including "habitat takings" within the regulatory definition of
"harm" within the statutory definition of "take."
Neither the facts of Sweet Home, a facial challenge to an agency
regulation, nor Justice Stevens' majority opinion, grounded in deference to
the agencies power to interpret its statutory mandate, had anything to do
40 A person includes:
(A]n individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality,
or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any
State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or any other
entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).
4' 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). By its terms, the section 9 prohibition against takings applies
only to endangered species of fish and wildlife. However, USFWS regulations extend
the prohibition to threatened species of wildlife. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(c), 17.31(a)
(1997).
42 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. Normal behavior patterns include, but are not limited to, "breeding,
feeding and sheltering." Id.
43 Id.
41 Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
45 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
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with the balancing issue. However, some language in the decision
suggested a softening in the Court's position in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill.6
The first hint came in the last full paragraph of the majority
opinion. After summing up the resounding victory for agency discretion,
Justice Stevens noted:
In the elaboration and enforcement of the ESA, the
Secretary and all persons who must comply with the law
will confront difficult questions of proximity and degree;
for, as all recognize, the Act encompasses a vast range of
economic and social enterprises and endeavors. These
questions must be addressed in the usual course of the law,
through case-by-case resolution and adjudication.7
What could this mean? Does the "usual course of the law" include
prohibitions against the exercise of equitable powers? How could the
Endangered Species Act of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, placing
species preservation above all considerations of costs, be reconciled with
"elaboration and enforcement" embracing "economic and social
enterprises and endeavors" or a "case-by-case" basis? Arguably this
language applies exclusively to agency actions, but the references to
"law," "cases" and "adjudication," suggest a judicial component.
The more significant hints appear in Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, in which she joined the Court's opinion on the understanding
that the application of the Section 9 "taking" prohibition be "limited by
ordinary principles of proximate causation, which introduce notions of
foreseeability." 8 Foreseeability turned out not to be the only component
in O'Connor's proximate cause:
Proximate causation is not a concept susceptible of precise
definition. It is easy enough, of course, to identify the
extremes. The farmer whose fertilizer is lifted by tornado
from tilled fields and deposited miles away in a wildlife
refuge cannot, by any stretch of the term, be considered the
proximate cause of death or injury to protected species
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
47 515 U.S. at 708 (emphasis added).
48 Id. at 709.
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occasioned thereby. At the same time, the landowner who
drains a pond on his property, killing endangered fish in the
process, would likely satisfy any formulation of the
principle. We have recently said that proximate causation
"normally eliminates the bizarre". ... Proximate causation
depends to a great extent on considerations of the fairness
of imposing liability for remote consequences. The task of
determining whether proximate causation exists in the
limitless fact patterns sure to arise is best left to lower
courts.49
Few environmentalists would be likely to quibble with the tornadoed
farmer. But what does "fairness" mean in this context? Is it fair to
prohibit a timber sale, when a salmon must scale a dozen dams to spawn in
the waters the timber sale might affect?"0 How is the lower court to use the
concept of proximate cause to work fairness in the absence of the power to
balance the value to the species against the harm its protection would
cause?
C. Bennett v. Spear: More Hints
In Sweet Home, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion
noting that the majority holding "imposes unfairness to the point of
financial ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who
finds his land conscripted to national zoological use."5 Two years later,
he authored the unanimous opinion of the Court in Bennett v. Spear.2
The issues in Bennett revolved around whether plaintiffs, who used
irrigation water from the Bureau of Reclamation's Klamath Irrigation
Project and whose interests in that water were primarily economic, could
sue the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to challenge the agency's
determination to maintain certain reservoir levels to protect two varieties
I ld. at 713 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
50 See generally Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 854 F. Supp. 713 (D. Or. 1993), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (enjoining ground disturbing activities
in national forests to protect endangered salmon); Pacific Northwest Generating
Cooperative v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Oregon 1993) (discussing Endangered
Species Act implications of the effect of hydroelectric dam operations on endangered
salmon), aff'd, 38 F. 3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
"' 515 U.S. at 714.
52 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
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of endangered fish. 3 The district court and Ninth Circuit determined
plaintiffs lacked standing to seek judicial review under the citizen suit
provision of the Act. The district court decided the case on a motion to
dismiss. No remedy, therefore, had been issued, nor had any balancing
been done?' The case did, however, offer the Supreme Court another
chance to ponder the relationship between the Endangered Species Act and
economic interests.
Justice Scalia first attacked the Ninth Circuit's assertion that
Plaintiffs economic claims did not fall within the "zone of interest" of the
Endangered Species Act.5 The "zone of interest" inquiry is a "prudential
standing requirement" which the court articulates as "whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."5 6 The Ninth Circuit had determined that the purely
environmental purpose of the Endangered Species Act-the preservation
of protected species and the ecosystems on which they depend-did not
describe a "zone of interest" that included economic claims. 7 The
Supreme Court found otherwise.
Justice Scalia's language suggests economic considerations
permeate the structure of the Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs asserted
that the USFWS failed to meet its obligations under section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act by failing to "use the best scientific and
commercial data available."" Concerning the purpose of that requirement,
Justice Scalia opined:
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency
"use the best scientific and commercial data available" is to
ensure that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on
the basis of speculation or surmise. While this no doubt
serves to advance the ESA's overall goal of species
preservation, we think it readily apparent that another
objective (if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid
5' See id. at 1157.
14 See id. at 1160.
55See id. at 1161.
56 Id. (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970)).
7 See Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 921 (1995).
58 117 S. Ct. at 1168 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994)).
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needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials
zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental
objectives."
Justice Scalia then immediately asserts that this concern: avoiding
"needless economic dislocation" caused by zealous but "unintelligent"
federal officials is one of the cornerstones of the Act:
That economic consequences are an explicit concern of the
Act is evidenced by § 1536(h), which provides exemption
from § 1536(a)(2)'s no-jeopardy mandate where there are
no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action
and the benefits of the agency action clearly outweigh the
benefits of any alternatives. We believe the "best scientific
and commercial data" provision is similarly intended, at
least in part, to prevent uneconomic (because erroneous)
jeopardy determinations. Petitioners' claim that they are
victims of such a mistake is plainly within the zone of
interests that the provision protects.6'
At one level, who would object? No one, environmentalists least
of all, wants zealous but unintelligent federal officials stopping
economically valuable activities if stopping them will not further the goal
of species preservation. But there is something else going on here. Why
does it follow that an error in an agency determination under the
Endangered Species Act can render that determination "uneconomic"?
Why is there any relationship at all between error in terms of the goal of
species preservation and short term economics? Is Justice Scalia positing
a constant and consequential economic value for species preservation
which justifies "correct" agency determinations when they impose
economic hardship to protect species (a nice but naive thought), or is he
suggesting that the purpose of the Act is to balance disputes between
species and economic interests and that an "erroneous" determination is
one that fails to strike such a balance?
The language in Bennett v. Spear is easier to reconcile with
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill than is the language in Sweet Home.
The "zone of interest" test only requires that Congress's wish be to protect
59 1d.
60 1d. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 22:313
BUTTERFLIES, CAVE SPIDERS
the interests asserted by plaintiffs (economic interests) when it drafted the
statute,61 and it does not directly contradict the idea that the statute placed
another interest (the preservation of species) above considerations of cost
and outside the reach of judicial balancing. On the other hand, it is hard to
imagine why a legislative body would have drafted a statute solicitous of
economic interests while directing the courts to ignore economic interests
in fashioning relief. While not directly questioning Hill, Scalia creates a
small paradox which, like the grain of sand inserted into an oyster, may
grow, like a pearl, into a contradiction requiring resolution. In the mean-
time, his language fuels the balancing debate.
D. Lower Court Roots 1991-1995
I do not want to give the Supreme Court too much credit for
precipitating the reconsideration of the prohibition against balancing in
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. At the same time that some lower
federal courts were issuing the broad ESA injunctions of the late 1980's
and early 1990's, others were already flirting with the idea of balancing.
On September 27, 1991, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia preliminarily enjoined the Montana Grizzly Bear
Hunt, scheduled to begin on October 1, 1991. In an unreported opinion,
Fund for Animals v. Turner,62 the court determined that the USFWS had
failed to provide an adequate basis for its regulation allowing sport
hunting of a threatened species. 6 Although the court did finally issue an
61 See id. at 1160.
62 No. CIV.A.91-2201(MB), 1991 WL 206232 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1991).
63 [I]t appears unlikely that the explanations offered by FWS provide a
rational basis for concluding that population pressures in the sense
intended by Congress existed in the [Northern Continental Divide
Ecosystem] as of 1986. The Court has made an additional, preliminary
effort to examine the administrative record on its own to see whether
there was nevertheless sufficient evidence in that record to support a
finding of population pressures. This effort, however, has not been
fruitful; in fact, material in the administrative record may corroborate
the conclusion that no rational finding of population pressures could be
made in 1986. For example, the FWS's 1982 recovery plan for the
grizzly bear states that there is no evidence to indicate that numbers of
grizzly bears in the [NCDE] are increasing. When the added stress of
increasing habitat encroachment by increasing numbers of people is
considered, the trend may be a decreasing population and the need for
action is obvious.
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injunction, in doing so, it began to recast and narrow the prohibition
against balancing:
The Court does not believe that [Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill] compels the Court to issue an injunction
in this case upon a finding of likelihood of success. In
TVA, it was stipulated that completion of the construction
project at issue-the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee
River-would result in the complete elimination of an
endangered species .... In this case, by contrast, there is
not the remotest possibility that the limited hunting of the
grizzly bear during the period in which a preliminary
injunction would be in place will eradicate the species....
Accordingly, the Court does not believe that the Supreme
Court's decision in TVA compels the issuance of an
injunction .... 64
Having distinguished Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the court
endeavored to achieve an accommodation with the spirit of the Hill
holding:
Nevertheless, TVA does underscore the weight Congress
has placed on the protection of endangered and threatened
species. . . . [T]he Court is sensitive to the harms
articulated by defendants that may result from the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. The success of the grizzly bear
conservation program depends upon the continued support
of the people of the State of Montana ... who must have
confidence that they have the flexibility to deal with the
difficult problems that arise in managing the bear
population. This confidence, it is said, would be
undermined by an eleventh-hour injunction upsetting a
federal-state program that has been in place for a number of
years.65
Is the court balancing or not? It limits the holding in Hill to
Id. at *5 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted).




species-wide threats, a conclusion difficult to draw from the language of
that opinion and at odds with analysis extending the balancing prohibition
to takings of individual species members. But, then, having freed itself
from that prohibition, it presents its analysis as reconciling two essential
elements of bear conservation-bears, alive in the wild and goodwill
toward bears, generated by shooting bears in the wild;' any economic
hardship associated with discontinuing the bear hunt three days before it
was scheduled to begin goes undiscussed.
In May 1994, in National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington
Northern Railroad, the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of an injunction in
an ESA case while admitting that a prohibited taking had occurred." In
the winter of 1988-89, three Burlington Northern Railroad trains carrying
grain derailed on a four-mile stretch of track in northwestern Montana. 8
Nearly 10,000 tons of corn spilled over an area of steep rocky terrain. 9
The corn spill attracted grizzlies to the site to feed." By October 1990,
seven grizzly bears in northwestern Montana had fatal encounters with
Burlington Northern trains.71 At least five of these bears were killed in the
immediate vicinity of the corn spills. The National Wildlife Federation
sued demanding protection for the bears. The Montana district denied the
National Wildlife Federation's motion for preliminary injunction. The
court applied a traditional injunctive balancing test and denied the motion
on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to prove that prohibited "takings"
were likely to happen again and because "the fact the [Burlington
Northern]'s trains killed grizzly bears does not, in and of itself, establish
irreparable injury."" The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The circuit court
disapproved the district court's use of the traditional injunctive balancing
test: "In cases involving the ESA, Congress removed from the courts their
traditional equitable discretion in injunction proceedings of balancing the
parties' competing interests. . ... -7 Then the court offered its own
66 See id.
67 23 F.3d 1508, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994).





" See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., No. CV-91-79-GF, 1992 WL
613680, at *2 (D. Mont. May 28, 1992).
74 Id.
" 23 F.3d at 1511.
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ambiguous analysis:
Nevertheless, these cases do not stand for the proposition
that courts no longer must look at the likelihood of future
harm before deciding whether to grant an injunction under
the ESA. Federal courts are not obligated to grant an
injunction for every violation of the law. The plaintiff must
make a showing that a violation of the ESA is at least likely
in the future.76
This is not balancing. But does it limit the prohibition against
balancing by granting courts back some of their traditional rights? The
issue of future harm is really one of "likelihood:" more about the extent
of the risk to bears than about its existence. After all, the risk from trains
had been demonstrated, as had the presence of bears in the area." The
likelihood of future harm is often a significant element in the balancing of
harms in traditional injunction analysis."
E. Response in the Lower Courts 1995-1997
Since the Supreme Court began dropping hints fueling the
balancing debate, lower federal courts have taken a wary stance, applying
the established law, but preparing to protect their rulings if the standard
changes. In Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County
Council, plaintiffs sued a Florida County claiming that county's
beach-related ordinances regarding lighting and vehicular access posed a
danger to endangered turtles. 9 The County allowed some vehicles on the
beach during turtle nesting season." Lighting demonstrably disoriented
both mother turtles and their young, and tire ruts prevented young turtles
from reaching the sea.81 Plaintiffs argued and the court agreed that driving
and lighting constituted a "taking" of endangered turtles in violation of
Section 9.82
7 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193
(1978)).
77 See id. at 1510.
78 See id. at 1511.
71 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1172 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
'0 See id. at 1174.
"I See id. at 1174-75, 1180-82.
82 See id. at 1180-82.
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In arguing against plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction,
the County asserted that Sweet Home had changed the law, giving it a
chance to argue that the value of lighting and driving on the beach
outweighed the harm done to the turtles." The court disagreed:
Volusia County points to language at the end of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon as an
indication that the Supreme Court has softened its stand on
the strictness with which courts must construe their
obligations under the Endangered Species Act .....
The Court agrees with the County in a limited sense.
Under the Endangered Species Act, concepts such as
"harm" and "harass" [within the definition of "take"] are
subject to differing and complex analyses. An analysis of
the concept of "significant habitat modification," for
example, must take account of various fact-specific
circumstances which can only be assessed within the
context of the case itself.
As for a balancing of affected "economic and social
enterprises," the language of the Act clearly leaves this job
to the Secretary of the Interior and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service.... If Congress had wanted the federal courts to
undertake a similar balancing of interests, it could have
enacted such legislation. '
The court's opinion is a victory for the orthodoxy; balancing the equities is
still out of the question. To make this point, the ruling does some violence
to the Sweet Home language. The court's categorical rejection of
balancing implies that the "case-by-case resolution and adjudication" in
"the usual course of the law" invoked by the Supreme Court in Sweet
Home has nothing to do with courts. 5
On the other hand, the Loggerhead court's language recognizing
the "various fact-specific circumstances" to be considered in applying the
elements of the taking prohibition, leaves some room for balancing
arguments and sidesteps the questions of fairness and foreseeability raised
83 See id. at 1179.
84 Id. (citations omitted).
8 See supra, note 47 and accompanying text.
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by Justice O'Connor in her Sweet Home concurrence. 6
More recently, in Strahan v. Coxe,7 the First Circuit sidestepped an
argument based on Justice O'Connor's proximate cause concurrence."
Richard Strahan, an officer of GreenWorld, Inc.,89 filed suit claiming
Massachusetts state officers were violating the Endangered Species Act by
licensing gillnet and lobster pot fishing in coastal waters? Evidence
indicated that endangered Northern Right Whales had become entangled
in fishing gear and that these entanglements might have resulted in the
death of a number of the species." The deaths were significant loss
because only about 300 Northern Right whales still exist on the planet.9"
The district court ordered the Massachusetts officials to take steps
to reduce the risk to the protected whales and apply for an incidental
taking permit under the Endangered Species Act.93  Massachusetts
appealed. They argued, among other things, that their licensing activities
did not "proximately cause" injury to the protected whales." The court
disagreed:
86 See 896 F. Supp. at 1179.
87 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 81 (1998).
88Id. at 163-64.
89 See id. at 158.
90 See id.
9' See id. at 159.
92 See id. at 158.
9' See id. at 158. ESA sections 7(b)(4) and 7(o)(2) authorize the Secretary of the Interior
to include incidental taking statements as part of biological opinions rendered for Federal
action agencies through the section 7 consultation process. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)4), (o)(2)
(1994). These "statements" allow a Federal agency or applicant that is subject to section
7(a)(2) and that is planning to engage in an activity not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of a species, to take members of that species if the taking is not the purpose of
the action and, therefore, "incidental" to the action. See id.
If, after section 7 consultation, the Secretary concludes that the action subject to
consultation will not jeopardize the species and that the "incidental taking" is not likely
to jeopardize the species, then the Secretary must formulate a statement concerning the
incidental taking. See id. § 1536(b)(4). This statement must specify the extent of the
incidental take, specify reasonable and prudent measures that are necessary to minimize
the impact, and set forth the terms and conditions that the action agency and any
applicant must comply with in order to implement the reasonable and prudent measures,
and specify procedures for handling or disposing of taken species. See id. Section
7(o)(2) provides that any taking in compliance with a section 7(b)(4) incidental take
statement "shall not be considered to be a prohibited taking of the species concerned."
1d. § 1536(o)(2).
94 See 127 F.3d at 163.
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The defendants argue that the statute was not intended to
prohibit state licensure activity because such activity cannot
be a "proximate cause" of the taking. The defendants direct
our attention to long-standing principles of common law
tort in arguing that the district court improperly found that
its regulatory scheme "indirectly causes" these takings.
Specifically, the defendants contend that to construe the
proper meaning of "cause" under the ESA, this court
should look to common law principles of causation and
further contend that proximate cause is lacking here. The
defendants are correct that when interpreting a term in a
statute which is, like "cause" here, well-known to the
common law, the court is to presume that Congress
intended the meaning to be interpreted as in the common
law. We do not believe, however, that an interpretation of
"cause" that includes the "indirect causation" of a taking by
the Commonwealth through its licensing scheme falls
without the normal boundaries .....
In this instance, the state has licensed commercial fishing
operations to use gillnets and lobster pots in specifically the
manner that is likely to result in a violation of federal law.
The causation here, while indirect, is not so removed that it
extends outside the realm of causation as it is understood in
the common law.95
The circuit court never discusses Justice O'Connor's concurrence, the
meaning of proximate cause in the protected species context or, even
whether proximate cause should be applied in the protected species
context.
Even more recently, in House v. United States Forest Service, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky relegated
a United States Forest Service balancing argument to a footnote.96 The
Forest Service asserted that it could balance the apparent virtues of an
extensive timber sale on the Daniel Boone National Forest97 against
9' Id. at 163-64 (citation omitted).
96 974 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 n.8 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
"[T]he Leatherwood Project consists of seven separate cutting units that will harvest
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protection of the endangered Indiana bat.98 In footnote eight, the court
observed:
While the Court agrees that defendants have some
discretionary powers as to the methods of conservation it
desires to implement, it does not agree with defendants'
assertion that defendants may balance competing agency
interests with the conservation of an endangered species, as
this flies smack in the face of the Supreme Court's holding
in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill."
Most recently, in Bensman v. United States Forest Service, the
United States District Court for the western district of Missouri took a
strong position supporting the traditional prohibition against balancing,
but considered a balancing standard to strengthen its ruling.'" Bensman
involved a United States Forest Service salvage sale in the summer habitat
of the same endangered Indiana Bat.'0 ' The bat had suffered a population
decline of eighty-two percent in Missouri since 1983.102 On October 17,
1997, the court held a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction.' 3 The Forest Service argued that, despite the fact that the
proposed salvage timber sale would likely result in a taking of the
endangered bat, the court should balance the welfare of the bat against the
virtues of yet another timber sale: reducing forest fire fuel accumulation,
facilitating new tree growth, removing the hazards to the safety of the
public, and providing "naturally harvested" trees to meet the public
demand for wood products." ' The court disagreed:
Defendants maintained at the preliminary injunction
hearing that the Court must apply a traditional balancing
commercial saw timber and firewood on approximately 199 acres. The project also
entails the construction and/or reconstruction of approximately 2.6 miles of logging
roads." Id. at 1025 (citation omitted).
9' The bat is legally famous as the victim in one of the earliest Endangered Species Act
cases. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
9" 974 F. Supp. at 1027 n.8 (citation omitted).
'00 984 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
10" See id. 1245.
102 See id.
'03 See id. at 1244.
1
0 4 See id. at 1247.
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test to determine if the Forest Service acted arbitrarily or
capriciously, weighing the harm the agency action would
impose on the Indiana bats against the other competing
interests of the Forest Service. The Supreme Court has
stated, however, in unequivocal terms:
The plain intent of Congress in enacting [the
ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost.
•.. [T]he legislative history undergirding §
7 reveals an explicit congressional decision
to require agencies to afford first priority to
the declared national policy of saving
endangered species. The pointed omission
of the type of qualifying language
previously included in endangered species
legislation reveals a conscious decision by
Congress to give endangered species priority
over the "primary missions" of federal
agencies...
[T]he Court concludes that the Forest Service is bound by
the ESA . . . to place the Indiana bat at the top of their
priority list. '
But the court did not stop there. Aware that the principle it enunciated so
clearly was in some doubt, it went on to apply a balancing test to buttress
its injunction:
[E]ven applying a balancing test to these factors, the Court
finds that protection of the Indiana bat's habitat far
outweighs the factors endorsed by the Forest Service. The
salvage operation will remove only logs. All of the small
limbs will be cut and left lying on the ground "not over 30
inches" tall. The Court can imagine no better fire source
than dead tree limbs stacked 30 inches tall on the forest
floor. Further, the likelihood of a tree falling on an errant
hiker is far more remote than the harm posed to the Indiana
bat by removal of possible roost trees. Viewed against the
o' Id. at 1247 (first and second alteration in original) (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 185, 187 (1978)).
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destruction of habitat of a species whose numbers have
declined by 82 % in Missouri in spite of conservation
efforts since 1983, the remaining factors do not prevent the
Court from finding that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily
and capriciously. °0
The frequency of cases addressing balancing arguments under the
Endangered Species Act and the limited, cryptic, and double-footed
rulings of lower federal courts in response to those arguments
demonstrates that the Supreme Court hints about balancing have had an
effect on litigants and, to a lesser degree, judges.
III. THIRTEEN SPECIES ON THE BRINK
The issue is on the table: should the federal courts do away with
the prohibition against balancing species protection against the economic
dislocation it may cause? Which Supreme Court should we heed? The
one that decided, and still cites Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill with
approval, or the one that hints that judges should weigh the value of
species protection against the economic dislocation it causes? The answer
I offer is practical. It is the only answer that does not frustrate the goals of
the Endangered Species Act. Federal courts should defend the orthodoxy
annunciated in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.'°7 To do otherwise
would likely result in the eventual extinction of a significant number of the
species Congress intended the Act to protect.
To illustrate, between October 22 and December 5, 1997, the
USFWS made the final decision to list fifteen new species as
endangered.' 8 This Article will discuss thirteen of those species.'" The
106 Id.
107 437 U.S. 153, 184-88 (1978).
08 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered
Status for Callippe Silverspot Butterfly and the Behren's Silverspot Butterfly and
Threatened Status for the Alameda Whip Snake, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,306 (1997) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed
Endangered Status for Two Cave Animals from Kauai, Hawaii, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,340
(1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17) (proposed Dec. 5, 1997); Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered Status for Nine Plants
from the Grassland or Mesic Areas of the Central Coast of California, 62 Fed. Reg.
54,791 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
' The author neglects the Suisan Thistle and Soft Birdis Beak, for which listing notices
were published on November 20, 1997, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,916 (1997) for fear of
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sample size and timing were dictated not by any scientific methodology,
but rather by the publication deadlines for this symposium and the author's
fear of losing his readers' interest. Nonetheless, it is a fairly representative
sample. None of the listed species is glamorous, and none is a mammal.
The species are plants and arthropods."' Such humble species represent
much of the work of the Endangered Species Act,"' with good reason. It
is species like these that form the bulk of the biological fabric of the
planet. Without exception, these thirteen species have been dramatically
reduced in population and distribution."' Without exception they are
subject to a variety of threats, any one of which might drive them to
extinction." '3 At the time of listing, each was balancing on the brink of
oblivion."'1
A. Butterflies and Cave Dwellers
1. Callippe silverspot butterfly (Speyeria callippe callippe) and Behren's
silverspot butterfly (Speyeria zerene behrensii)
In December 1997, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
added two species of California butterfly to the list of endangered species,
the callippe silverspot butterfly (Speyeria callippe callippe) and Behren's
silverspot butterfly (Speyeria zerene behrensii)."5 These two species exist
only along the coast of northern California."6  Each depends on a
particular flower species for propagation and larval food: for the callippe
overwhelming the reader with California coastal plans.
1 See infra Part Il.A-B.
... As of June 30, 1997 the list of domestic species listed as endangered included 56
mammals, 75 birds, 14 reptiles, 9 amphibians, 67 fishes, 15 snails, 56 claims, 15
crustaceans, 24 insects, 5 arachnids, 500 flowering plants, 2 conifers, and 26 ferns.
United States Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, ENDANGERED
SPECIES BULLETIN, July/August 1997, p. 28 (box score). See United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Box Score <http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/
boxscore.html> on the world wide web for the latest listings.
112 See infra Part III.A-B.
"" See infra Part III.A-B.
" See infra Part ILA-B.
"1 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Determination of Endangered Status
for Callippe Silverspot Butterfly and the Behren's Silverspot Butterfly and Threatened
Status for the Alameda Whip Snake, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,306 (1997).
'"' See id. at 64,306-07.
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silverspot the Johnny jump-up (Viola pedunculata);7 for the Behren's
silverspot, another violet, Viola adunca."8 The callippe silverspot exhibits
"hilltopping behavior," adult males and females seek the summit of a hill
to mate. 19
The callippe silverspot butterfly is known from fourteen historic
populations in the San Francisco Bay region and may have existed in
many more.2 0 The historic range of the callippe silverspot butterfly
included the inner Coast Ranges on the eastern shore of San Francisco Bay
and, on the west side of the Bay, from San Francisco south to the vicinity
of La Honda in San Mateo County.'2' In 1997, only two populations of the
species remained, one on private land on San Bruno Mountain in San
Mateo County, and the other in a city park in Alameda County.'22 The
range of Behren's silverspot butterfly once extended from the mouth of the
Russian River in Sonoma County northward along the coast to southern
Mendocino County.'23 At least six historic populations existed.' 2 Now,
the single extant population survives on private land near Point Arena in
Mendocino County.'25
Of the two remaining populations of the Callippe Silverspot, the
one in the Alameda County city park is small and threatened with
extirpation by human use of the area,' 26 and the San Bruno Mountain
population is protected by the famous San Bruno Mountain Habitat
Conservation Plan, established in the early 1980's to protect another
species of butterfly.'27 However, lepidopterists threatened the species with
"








"5 See id. at 64,308.
216 See id. at 64,312-19.
127 In the late 1970s, San Bruno Mountain, directly south of San Francisco in San Mateo
County, included about 3,400 acres of undeveloped land. See Steven White, Note,
Where Have All the Butterflies Gone? Ninth Circuit Upholds Decision to Allow
Incidental Taking, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 93, 93-4 (1986). Vistacion Associates
had purchased the land for residential and commercial development. See id. at 94. In
1980, Vistacion and San Mateo County settled on a plan under which about 2,000 of the
3,400 acres would be set aside for parkland and the rest opened for development. See id.
After the 1980 deal, the USFWS discovered that the endangered Mission Blue Butterfly
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over-collection.' 8 Cattle graze on the site of the one remaining population
of the Behren's silverspot butterfly.2 9
2. Kauai cave wolf spider (Adelocosa anops) and the Kauai cave
amphipod (Spelaeorchestia koloana)
and two other proposed endangered species inhabited the open land. See id. at 94-95. In
1981 after an extensive biological study, representatives of the County, Vistacion, local
municipalities, USFWS, the California Department of Fish and Game, and the
Committee to Save San Bruno Mountain began negotiations to put together a habitat
conservation plan to protect the endangered species while allowing development. See id.
at 95. In November 1982, USFWS received a formal request for a 10(a) permit for the
San Bruno development. See id. at 95-96. On March 4, 1983, USFWS granted the
permit application. See Issuance of Permit for Incidental Take of Endangered Species,
48 Fed. Reg. 10,136 (1983). The San Bruno plan permitted the destruction of about
fourteen percent of the habitat of the endangered Mission Blue Butterfly, creating an
estimated two to five percent increase in the likelihood of the butterfly's extinction. See
Richard E. Webster, Comment, Habitat Conservation Plans Under the Endangered
Species Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 243, 249-50 (1987).
In November 1983, Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. challenged the San
Bruno conservation plan incidental take permit in court on the grounds that it violated
section 10(a) and section 7 by jeopardizing the continued existence of the Mission Blue
Butterfly, one of the species for which it authorized takings. See Friends of Endangered
Species v. Jantzen, 596 F. Supp. 518, 519 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir.
1985). On January 7, 1984, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California denied Friends of Endangered Species' motion for preliminary injunction and
rejected its ESA claims. See id. at 520. The district court noted that Congress, in its
1982 amendments to the Act, had used the San Bruno plan as an exemplar of possible
section 10(a) conservation plans. See id. at 522. The court also observed that the plan
had been reviewed and endorsed by a variety of independent experts. See id. at 523.
On May 14, 1985, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. See
Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985). The court
empha-sized: (1) that Congress had considered the San Bruno plan as a "paradigm" for
section 10(a) conservation plans; (2) that USFWS had determined that the plan would
enhance the habitat of the Mission Blue Butterfly; (3) that USFWS had considered expert
opinion and public comment before issuing the incidental take permit; and (4) that the
permit was subject to revocation or reconsideration if significant new information
emerged from the monitoring required under the plan. See id. at 982-83. The court
found that the plan's proposed mitigation measures reasonably met the requirements of
section 10(a). See id. at 982-85. The court noted that the plan permanently protected
86% of the Mission Blue Butterfly habitat and provided for habitat enhancement. See id.
at 984.
.2. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Determination of Endangered
Status for Callippe Silverspot Butterfly and the Behren's Silverspot Butterfly and
Threatened Status for the Alameda Whip Snake, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,306, 64,312 (1997).
129 Id.
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On the same day, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service listed
two Hawaiian cave dwellers, the Kauai cave wolf spider (Adelocosa
anops) and the Kauai cave amphipod (Spelaeorchestia koloana).'30 The
spider hunts and eats the amphipod.1'' Because the habitat needs of the
two species and the dangers they face are quite similar, this Article will
discuss only the (slightly more glamorous) cave spider.
In the formation of the Hawaiian islands, lava flows created caves,
cracks, and smaller, interconnected subterranean spaces. 31 Unique sub-
terranean faunas have long been known from temperate continental cave
systems, however, it was not until the 1970's that specialized cave
inhabiting animals were known on tropical islands. "' Since then, fifty
species of cave-adapted animals, including the Kauai cave wolf spider,
have been discovered in Hawaiian caves."' The Kauai cave wolf spider is
a member of the wolf spider family.'" The most conspicuously diagnostic
character of the Kauai cave spider is its complete lack of eyes."'6 Despite
its blindness, the Kauai cave wolf spider is a predator; it detects the
presence of potential food items and actively stalks its prey." 7
The spider lives only in a four square mile coastal section of lava
flows."'8 The flows contain fissures and lava tubes that have not been
filled with sediment."' Even in this area, the Kauai cave wolf spider has
been found only in two lava tube systems.'4 0 Surface modifications in the
area above effect this subterranean habitat.'' Originally, the above ground
habitat of this area was probably a coastal dry scrubland dominated by
native plants known to produce extensive root systems that may have
30 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Endangered Status for
Two Cave Animals From Kauai, Hawaii, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,340 (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17) (proposed Dec. 5, 1997).
"' See id. at 64,341.
32 See id. at 64,340.
"' See id.
34 See id. at 64,340-41.






141 See id. at 64,342.
338 [Vol. 22:313
BUTTERFLIES, CAVE SPIDERS
formed the primary nutrient source for the cave ecosystem., 2 After 1935,
much of the area above the spider caves was used for intensive sugar
cultivation.4  In recent years, the land has been subject to urban
development related to tourism.'" Today, "urban" and "urban residential"
uses cover approximately seventy-five percent of the original habitat
available for the cave spider.4 5 The human population of the surrounding
Koloa area is expected to double by the year 2015.'" Interior lands
supporting the two known remaining populations of the spider have been
rezoned from agriculture to urban usage. 47  Construction of roads,
residences, and golf courses degrades the remaining subterranean habitat
by removing perennial vegetation and collapsing lava tubes, and causing
siltation from grading and filling activities.'48 One of the two populations
of the Kauai cave wolf spider is also directly threatened by a proposed
bypass road.' 49
In addition, several alien spiders including the brown violin spider
(Loxosceles rufescens), Dysdera crocata, and the spitting spider (Scytodes
longipes) have invaded the cave habitats and prey on immature stages of
the Kauai cave wolf spider.'"
Golf courses and residential development also results in extensive
use of pesticides, particularly insecticides. 5' The cave spider is
particularly susceptible to pesticides because of its tendency to seek water
sources.' 2 Pesticides that leach into adjacent subterranean caverns with
water from runoff or irrigation may attract spiders.'
B. Nine Endangered Plants
In October 1997, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service






14 See id. at 64,343.
148 See id.
149 See id. at 64,343.
50 See id.
,'5 See id.
'12 See id. at 64,344.
153 See id.
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species.'54 All nine species exist in northern California in areas subject to
significant ongoing development pressure and population growth.'
1. The Clara Hunt's milk-vetch (Astragalus clarianus)
The Clara Hunt's milk-vetch is a low growing annual herb in the
pea family.'56 It grows only on thin, rocky clay soils derived from volcanic
or serpentine substrates in grasslands and openings in manzanita-blue oak
woodlands.'57 The species is known from six historic populations, all
occurring in Napa and Sonoma counties.' 8 Urbanization and conversion
of land to vineyards have extirpated two of these populations.'59
The four remaining populations, all restricted to one seventy-acre
area, face a variety of threats.' ° One population was reduced in size when
the creation of Lake Hennessey inundated much of the site. 6' In
December 1990, that remnant population was nearly destroyed when
dredge spoils from the lake were placed on top of it. ,62 Another population
located in Bothe Napa Valley State Park has varied between a low of eight
plants and a high of 220 plants over the last ten years.' 63 The area covered
by a large part of this population is subject to a State proposed camp-
ground.'6' The third population occurs near the City of Santa Rosa. 165 A
residential subdivision exists on adjacent land above this site.'6 Soil
erosion from proposed road and pad construction for house lots potentially
threatens this population.'67 The fourth population is scattered over less
"' See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered
Status for Nine Plants From the Grasslands or Mesic Areas of the Central Coast of
California, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,791 (1997).
' See id. at 54,791-92.





161 The City of Napa has since removed the spoils. However, the population has not re-
covered from the ground disturbance and faces an infestation of exotic weeds. See id. at
54,798.
162 See id.







than five acres of private land and has been reduced dramatically in the
recent years by feral pigs and other pressures.'68
2. Calistoga allocarya (Plagiobothrys strictus)
The Castiloga allocarya is a small erect, annual herb belonging to
the borage family.'69 It grows in pools and swales fed by hot springs and
small geysers near Calistoga.'70  The allocarya persists in only two
populations.'7' Seventy percent of the species' historical range has been
extirpated as a result of urbanization and agricultural land use.' One
population occurs near Myrtledale hot springs while the other occurs near
the airport in the city of Calistoga.'" The possibility of future
development near the airport site and airport maintenance activities
threaten the airport population.'7 The Myrtledale population is scattered
over 10 acres of private land.' The current owner has proposed building
a hospital on this site.' 6
3. Napa bluegrass (Poa napensis)
The Napa bluegrass is an erect, tufted perennial bunchgrass.'77 It
lives only in moist, alkaline meadows fed by hot springs within a four mile
radius of Calistoga. 8 Historically, the development of recreational hot
springs and the growth of the town have diminished the species range.'
Today, only two populations are known to exist; one near the Calistoga
airport and the other on private land near Myrtledale Hot Springs.'80
Development of spas and airport construction have degraded the habitat of
161 See id.
169 See id. at 54,792.
170 See id.
171 See id.





171 See id. at 54,792.
17 See id.
1 See id.
o See id. at 54,799.
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both populations.'"' The population near the airport was thought to be
extinct until 1987.182 In 1994 and 1996, about 150 plants remained at this
site.'83 The Myrtledale population numbered in the thousands in the early
1980's. 84 However, the land owner has denied access to the property and
the population is subject to the same hospital proposal as the Castiloga
allocarya.'85
4. Sonoma alopecurus (Alopercurus aequalis var. sonomensis)
The Sonoma alopecurus is another tufted perennial grass.'86 It
occurs in moist soils in permanent freshwater marshes.'87 Historically, the
range of the species encompassed approximately thirty miles, extending
north from Point Reyes Peninsula to Guemeville and east to Cunning-
ham.'88 Now, only eight populations remain.'89 Invasive plant species,
trampling and grazing by cattle have dramatically reduced the number of
suitable sites."9 Cattle graze on seven of the existing eight populations. 9'
This species also suffers from competition from invasive wetland species
at one location.'92 These invasive wetland plants have nearly extirpated the
alopecurus from this site.'93 Naturally occurring floods may also be an
ongoing threat; one population was damaged by a flash flood in 1993. 9
Because alopecurus populations are normally small (less than 100
individuals) and fluctuate dramatically in size each population faces a high
probability of extirpation.'











'"' See id. at 54,800.
192 See id. at 54,802.
'93 See id.
14 See id.
"" See id. at 54,803.
342 [Vol. 22:313
The white sedge is an erect, loosely tufted, perennial herb reaching
heights of two feet.'" Historically, the white sedge grew along the Santa
Rosa creek and in two marshes. 9' Channelization of the Santa Rosa creek,
use of one marsh as a cannery waste disposal site, and the desiccation of
the other marsh as a result of groundwater pumping have apparently
extirpated the species from these sites.'98  The single known existing
population grows in a sphagnum bog approximately 150 feet from a State
highway.' 99 Any direct impact or change in the hydrology of the area
resulting from highway widening might destroy the population.2" The
State operates a wastewater treatment facility approximately 325 yards
from this population."' Although the facility does not have any current
adverse impacts on the remaining population, implementation of the
proposed wastewater recycling program could result in the alteration of the
remaining habitat.0 2
6. Vine Hill clarkia (Clarkia imbricata)
The Vine Hill clarkia is an herb in the evening-primrose family.0 3
The clarkia survives in two populations, one naturally occurring and the
other planted in a preserve .2 1 The two populations are less than a mile
apart.0 5 The natural population consists of between 2,000 and 5,000 plants
and occurs on an open, flat grassland surrounded by a variety of
introduced trees and shrubs.2°0 The population is threatened by changing
land use, conversion to agriculture, and inadvertent mowing.0 ' These
activities have already extirpated other historically known populations of
the species.0 8
The planted population grows in a natural preserve and has
196 See id. at 54,793.
197 See id.
98 See id.




203 See id. at 54,793.
204 See id. at 54,794.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 54,799.
2"0 See id.
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fluctuated between 200 and 500 plants."° This population is susceptible to
overcollection 1 '°  Trespassers have damaged the habitat, trampled
vegetation, and collected the seeds of the clarkia21 '
7. Pitkin Marsh lily (Lilium pardalinum ssp. pitkinense)
The Pitkin Marsh lily is a perennial member of the lily family
reaching heights of six feet."' It grows only in permanently saturated,
sandy soils in freshwater marshes and wet meadows."' All three known
populations occur on private land within eight miles of each other. '" The
site containing two populations of the lily was largely destroyed by
urbanization in 1961; only 300 individuals remain there."' At the second
site, wetland fills in the marsh have lowered the water table and resulted in
drier soil conditions." 6 This population was nearly extirpated by un-
controlled collection of the plant, seeds, and bulbs."7 As a result, the
population was reduced to only two individuals, but has since expanded
slightly to ten individuals."8 The lily also suffers from grazing by cattle,
deer, and other herbivores which has resulted in the loss of flowers and
seeds.219
8. Kenwood Marsh checker-mallow (Sidalcea oregana ssp. valida)
The Kenwood Marsh checker-mallow is a perennial herb which
grows up to six feet tall and occurs in freshwater marshes.22 There are two
known populations of the species, both on private land.22 ' One population
covers less than a quarter of an acre and was reported as having less than
209 See id. at 54,794.
210 See id. at 54,800.
211 See id.
211 See id. at 54,794.
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id. at 54,799.








100 individuals in 1979 and only sixty in 1993.222 The other population
contained only seventy individuals in 1993.223 One of the two remaining
sites is threatened by water diversions from a stream that flows into the
marsh where the population occurs.22 These water diversions may
exacerbate the adverse affects of naturally occurring droughts.225 The
checker-mallow is also adversely affected by cattle grazing at both of its
existing sites. 26
9. Showy Indian clover (Trifolium amoenum)
Finally, the showy Indian clover is an annual member of the pea
family growing to heights of twenty-seven inches. 27 Historically, the
species grew at twenty locations"' in a variety of habitats including low
wet grasslands, and grassy hillsides. 29 The historic range of the species
extended from the western edge of the Sacramento Valley in Solano
County, west and north to Main and Sonoma counties.23 Loss of habitat
resulting from urbanization and land conversion to agriculture drastically
reduced areas of suitable habitat. 3' The plant was believed to be extinct232
until one locality was discovered in 1993; since then another has been
discovered. 33 However, the population discovered in 1993 has since been
extirpated.3 The single existing occurrence of the species consists of
about 200 individuals growing on two residential lots in Main County. 35
A house is already on one of the lots, and on the other lot, one is being
built.236 Both owners have been cooperating in the conservation of the
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See id. at 54,800.
225 Although the checker-mallow has not been subject to over-collection, both
populations are small enough that limited collecting pressures would also have adverse
impacts on the species. See id.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 54,794.
228 See id. at 58,000.
229 See id. at 54,794.
230 See id.
231 See id. at 54,800.
232 See id. at 54,794.
233 See id. at 54,795.
2 4 See id.
2135 See id.
2 3 See id.
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species on their land. 237 However, if the owners further develop or alter
their properties, they may no longer contain a suitable habitat for the
species."' Grazing by cattle an other animals also injures this species and
is believed to be responsible for the showy Indian clover's disappearance
from some of it former locations. 39
IV. JUDICIAL BALANCING ON THE BRINK
We could go on to discuss the Catalina Island mountain-mahogany
(Cercocarpus traskiae), one of California's rarest trees, which is now
limited to a single population of only six mature individuals, or the San
Clemente Island woodland-star (Lithophragma maximum) and the Santa
Cruz Island rockcress (Sibarafilifolia) 4° We could also consider the San
Francisco lessingia (Lessingia germanorum), which was once common on
wind-swept dunes now covered by the City of San Francisco;"" the Contra
Costa goldfields (Lasthenia conjugens); the few-flowered navarretia
(Navarretia leucocephala ssp. pauciflora)-limited to only five
populations; 42 the many-flowered navarretia (Navarretia leucocephala
ssp. plieantha); and the Lake County stonecrop (Parvisedum leiocarpum),
which is now restricted to one three acre area. 4 All were listed in the last
six months of 1997. The impression would be similar.
What do I want you to take away from these thumbnail sketches of
thirteen species victims of human development in California and Hawaii?
And what does it have to do with the idea of judicial balancing under the
Endangered Species Act? I suggest two lessons.
237 See id.
238 See id. at 54,800.
239 See id. at 54,801.
240 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Determination of Endangered
Status for Three Plants From the Channel Islands of Southern California, 62 Fed. Reg.
42,692, 42,692-94 (1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.12).
241 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Endangered Status for the Plant
Lessingia Germanorum (San Francisco Lessingia) From California, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,368,
33,369 (1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.12).
242 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Endangered Status for Four
Plants From Vernal Pools and Mesic Areas in Northern California, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,029,
33,030 (1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.12).
243 See id. at 33,03 1.
2-4 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1997).
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A. The Danger of Extinction
First, and most obviously, these are indeed species on the brink of
extinction. The callippe silverspot butterfly, Kauai cave wolf spider, Vine
Hill clarkia, Pitkin Marsh lily, Calistoga allocarya, and Kenwood Marsh
checker-mallow cling to existence at only two locations each." 5 The
Behren's silverspot, white sedge and the showy Indian clover persist in
only one.2"6 Clara Hunt's milk-vetch exists at four sites, the relatively
fortunate Sonoma alopecurus has eight populations, but its populations are
small." 7 The consistent combination of few populations, narrow range,
and restricted habitat makes each species a good candidate for
extinction.2"8
The sense one gets from reading accounts of recently listed species
is that it will take a significant effort to protect what remains and,
eventually, to reverse their decline and bring them to a point at which they
have a reasonable chance of surviving into the foreseeable future.4 9 This
is particularly true when we consider the lessons of conservation biology.
The perspective of conservation biologists offers a new model of species
preservation problems, the "probabilities model." The conceptual
underpinning of the probabilities model is that the survival of any species
over time is a matter of chance and that the probabilities are primarily a
function of the population size and distribution of the species.' A
specific detrimental action or project may affect the probabilities of
species survival and even drive a species to extinction, but its significance
can only be understood in terms of the size and distribution of the
population it affects."' "Bad luck" comes to every species whether it is
245 See supra Parts III.A.1, A.2, B.2, B.6, B.7, and B.8.
246 See supra Parts III.A.1, B.5, and B.9.
24? See supra Parts III.B. 1 and B.4.
248 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Endangered
Status for Nine Plants From the Grasslands or Mesic Areas of the Central Coast of
California, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,791, 54803 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
249 Obviously, a prohibition against judicial balancing will not suffice to protect these
species. "Recovery" must take place. See Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A
New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1996);
John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the Endangered
Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501 (1994).
250 See Mark Shaffer, Minimum Viable Populations: Coping with Uncertainty, in VIABLE
POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION 69, 76 (Michael E. Soule ed., 1987).
2" "If the species is to survive 200 years, management must ameliorate the prevailing
catastrophe scenario or more than one population must be maintained." ld.
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protected by the Endangered Species Act or not. For a species to have a
decent chance of survival it must be sufficiently numerous and sufficiently
widespread to survive the catastrophic events which are an inevitable part
of life on this planet. None of our thirteen species exist in sufficient
numbers over a sufficiently large area to survive even a modest
catastrophe. 252
But rarity and the dangers it brings are not the only bad news.
Each of our thirteen species is subject to a variety of threats from human
occupation and degradation of habitat and the introduction of exotic
species. 5 Road construction, housing development, cattle grazing, golf
courses, pesticide residue and spitting spiders form a phalanx of threats
that any one of these species will be lucky to survive. To take away what
little they have left would relegate many to extinction.
Why do so many of the species recently listed seem to be in such
alarmingly bad shape? Part of the explanation may be the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service's apparent lack of enthusiasm for additional
listings. Almost ten years ago, the agency received a battering in federal
court for failing to list the Northern Spotted Owl as a threatened species.25
A change of administration does not seem to have changed the view of the
agency. A recent report issued by Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility (PEER) entitled War of Attrition: Sabotage of the
Endangered Species Act by the US. Department of Interior, documents
lobbying by the agency to reduce the amount of money appropriated for
listing.255 In April 1997, in Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia overturned the agency's
decision not to list the Canada Lynx as threatened or endangered on the
ground that "the agency [made] a number of unsupported statements
which contain[ed] significant factual errors contradicted by overwhelming
record evidence." '256 The court found that the significant factual errors
were "clear indications that the agency's decisionmaking, [was] based on
252 See supra Part III.
253 See supra Part III.
254 See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(overturning the USFWS decision not to list the spotted owl and concluding that USFWS
had disregarded expert opinion, including the opinions of experts it employed).
255 War of Attrition: Sabotage of the Endangered Species Act by the U.S. Department of
Interior, WHITE PAPER (Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility, Washington D.C.),
Dec. 1997, at 5 (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review).
2 6 958 F. Supp. 670, 682 (D.D.C. 1997).
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glaringly faulty factual premises ..... 257 Reluctance to list in general,
may insure that those species that are listed are in dire straits indeed.
B. Apparent Value
The second lesson I hope you will draw from our thirteen profiles
is that most listed species seem insignificant in themselves. The world
contains other species of cave spiders, butterflies, sedges, lilies and
checker-mallows. None of these thirteen species is likely to appear on a
postage stamp. They are poor candidates for television nature
programming. This apparent lack of significance is significant itself
because it suggests the outcome of any process of judicial balancing in
which any of these modest bits of creation are pitted against, say for
instance, the right of the citizens of Alameda County to enjoy their park, a
Hawaiian resort housing development, a new state campground, the
safety-minded expansion of the Calistoga airport, a state highway, or a
municipal wastewater recycling facility.
Traditionally, injunction is an equitable remedy; "it is not a remedy
which issues as of course.""2 ' Absent a ban on judicial balancing, a United
States District Court judge would consider the relative harm to the parties
before the court, as well as "the public interest,""25 when faced with the
decision whether to enjoin some activity that threatens a population of
endangered species. The Supreme Court stated in Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, which was decided under the Clean Water Act,2" that in
each case, a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must
consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief.' Although particular regard should be given to the
public interest, "[t]he grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a
statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all
circumstances . "..."262 Under this test, a judge would have the discretion
to refuse to enjoin an action that might result in the destruction of a
species or one of its few remaining populations, even when that action
.57 Id. at 682.
258 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982) (quoting Harrisonville v.
W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1933)).
259 See id. at 312-13
260 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
261 See id. at 312.
262 id. at 313.
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clearly violated the Endangered Species Act.
Further, in striking the balance our judge would weigh the effects
on the parties in the case, not on the species at risk. In other words, she
would balance the economic dislocation associated with enjoining the
species threatening project against the harm species extinction will cause
the environmental plaintiffs and not against the harm it will cause the
species. Human defenders of protected species focus their concern on
threats to the species. The risk of annihilation makes for compelling
arguments, but protected species are not parties in the law suits brought to
protect them. Therefore, courts, in balancing the harm between parties
would consider, not the direct harm the species would suffer, but the
indirect harm its human defenders would suffer. The extinction of a
species of California butterfly is a significant event-the most significant
possible event for all the members of that species. It will not, however,
drive the Sierra Club or Defenders of Wildlife out of business, and it will
engender only a passing phase of depression and panic in organization
members who once enjoyed observing the butterfly and wandering the
hills where it lived.
In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, decided under the
National Environmental Policy Act,263 the Supreme Court admitted:
"Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied
by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e.,
irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of
harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the
environment."26 However, the actual willingness of the Supreme Court to
overturn injunctions in cases involving environmental harm undercuts any
comfort this language might provide.265
Certainly, we can afford to lose a butterfly or two. Even more
certainly, we will lose more than a few in the years to come. Some
scholars have suggested developing priority systems for the preservation
of species..2 16 The folly of such systems is outside the scope of this article.
There is, however, no question that judicial balancing is no substitute for a
priority system. If we allow courts to balance the future of species, they
263 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
264 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
265 See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Marsh
v. Oregon natural resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village
of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).




will deal with each case and species in isolation, ignoring the pattern of
species extinction. A lawyer arguing for the preservation of a California
marsh plant species would be hard pressed to convince a judge to hear
evidence of the extent and significance of the global biodiversity crisis.
Published cases about endangered species rarely if ever consider this
broader context.267 This blindness to the cumulative impact of harm to
endangered species populations would encourage balancing in favor of
development and against species. In sum, application of the standard tests
for the issuance of an injunction would lead many a reasonable federal
judge to insist that these species give a little ground to some worthy
human endeavors, unaware or unmoved by how little ground these species
have to give.268
V. CONCLUSION
For twenty years judges of every political stripe in every region of
the country have stopped economically significant activities to protect
economically insignificant species. They have done so because the
dominant interpretation of the Endangered Species Act has forced them to
do so, taking the troublesome issue out of their hands. Philosophers
wrestle with how to compare the value of a cave spider and a
condominium, debating the issue at their leisure. Federal district court
judges, philosophers though many may be, must make decisions. No
267 One significant exception to this general proposition is the District of Columbia
Circuit Court's decision in National Association of Homebuilders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1052-54 (D.C. Cir. 1997), in which the court discussed the value of biological
diversity as a whole to buttress Congress' power to regulate intra-state endangered
species under the interstate commerce clause.
268 One embarrassing fact deserves recognition. Two unreversed federal district court
cases have applied the traditional balancing test to endangered species act claims. See
Sierra Club v. Lujan, 36 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 1554 (W.D. Tex. 1993); Sierra
Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1277 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in
part on other grounds sub nor. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
Both cases issued injunctions despite the application of the traditional test. What is
worse, I was counsel for the plaintiffs in one of those cases, Sierra Club v. Lyng.
Accordingly, I must smile when I assert that both cases involved such compelling factual
situations-clearcutting on Texas national forests in the face of a more than 40% decline
in the population of the endangered Red-Cockaded Woodpecker and the potential
annihilation of an entire eco-system in the Edwards Aquifer in south central Texas-that
the balancing of harm led to far clearer results than it would have with any of our thirteen
recently listed species.
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matter what their political convictions, they will often tip the balance in
favor of what they can see and count and enjoy and against a species of
relatively mundane creatures whose only distinction is the real possibility
that they will disappear from this planet for the rest of imaginable time.
And the slightest tip of the scale will often seal the fate of species already
so close to oblivion.
Finally, despite their apparent insignificance, there is also
something wonderful about every one of these thirteen species, something
worth preserving: the relationship between the butterflies and the violets
they require to survive; the ability of the cave spider to hunt without eyes;
the flowering lilies and mallows and peas. What are we willing to lose
forever?
